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INTRODUCTION
Because of the escalating cost of legal education and the
recent decline in bar passage rates among ABA approved law
schools, some analysts have reasonably attempted to determine
the social costs of legal education.1 Many have attempted to
place the blame on segments of the legal education marketplace.2
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The complicated relationships among the policies of providing
more access to justice, increasing minority representation in the
bar, and protecting the public from shoddy law practice have
recently inflamed academic debate. In the rush for assessing
blame, some analysts have published empirically flawed reports
that have received a great deal of media and academic attention,
but have not received serious methodological analysis. The
problem is that merely believing that one variable, such as LSAT
scores, causes results, such as lower bar examination scores
and/or increased ethical violations, is very different than
empirically proving that professed cause and effect relationship.
This article responds to two of these studies: one conducted by
Professor Kinsler in Is Bar Exam Failure a Harbinger of
Professional Discipline?3 and another conducted by Professors
Anderson and Muller in The High Cost of Lowering the Bar.4
These studies concluded that there is either a causal link and/or
a correlation between par passage scores and the probability of
state bar disciplinary rates. Both studies argue for more
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David
Frakt, ABA Standard 316 Gets Shot Down Again – Here’s How To Fix It, FAC.
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Rates – A Cautionary Tale, FAC. LOUNGE (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.thefaculty
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3
Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Is Bar Exam Failure a Harbinger of Professional
Discipline?, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 883, 922 (2017).
4
Robert Anderson IV & Derek T. Muller, The High Cost of Lowering the Bar,
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 21–22), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=2977359.
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restrictive access to law schools or, alternatively, for more
regulation of the legal stream leading to membership in the bar.
Their data does not support their drastic remedies.
I.

THE KINSLER STUDY

Professor Kinsler’s claim is simple: he states that a higher
percentage of attorneys who failed the bar exam multiple times
commit more ethical violations in their early careers than other
attorneys.5 Because he concludes that multiple bar examination
attorneys are a danger to the public, he proposes that states limit
the number of bar examination attempts applicants can take.6
Although Kinsler details the careers of attorneys that he
says prove his bar exam and ethical violation thesis, there is a
glaring omission—Kinsler did not discuss a single case in which
an attorney who took the bar exam multiple times was found to
have violated a disciplinary rule early in his or her career
involving any of the five skills he claims are tested on bar
examinations. He failed to demonstrate any nexus between
multiple bar exam failures and attorney disciplinary violations.
In addition, Kinsler fails to provide sufficient empirical data
to support his proposition that multiple bar examination
attorneys have a different pattern of disciplinary violations early
in their careers. In fact, a Connecticut ethics study cited by
Kinsler found that all attorneys who committed ethical
violations, not just those who failed the bar exam, committed
most ethical violations during what Kinsler terms “early” in their
careers.7 In Connecticut, “the average length of time between
admission and the filing of a grievance leading to a sanction was
10.74 years.”8 Kinsler’s logical leap in connecting the timing of
multiple bar exam test taker discipline “early in their careers” to
their lack of bar exam performance fails since almost all
disciplinary cases for all attorneys occur during that same time
frame.9
5

Kinsler, supra note 3, at 885.
Id. at 917–18.
7
Kinsler, supra note 3, at 900; Leslie C. Levin et al., A Study of the Relationship
Between Bar Admissions Data and Subsequent Lawyer Discipline 9 (Mar. 15, 2013),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2258164.
8
Levin et al., supra note 7, at 16.
9
Kinsler, supra note 3, at 899. Kinsler’s time period includes discipline “in the
first few years—ranging from two years to twelve years—of their legal careers.” Id.
at 893.
6
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The most fatal flaw in Kinsler’s argument and data is that
he did not produce evidence to demonstrate the level of
correlation between multiple bar attempts and ethical violations.
To illustrate his empirical failure, consider the following facts:
from February 2012 to February 2018, men tended to have a
lower “first-time” and a lower “repeater” (multiple bar exam)
passage rate than women did on the California Bar
Examination.10 The problem is that even though there is a
correlation between gender and the frequency of ethical
violations, the correlation is so low that it does not warrant
dramatic changes to the bar examination.11 For instance, a study
of the disciplinary patterns of Connecticut attorneys found that
men are 2.5% more likely to be disciplined by the state bar than
women are.12 However, the authors of that study cautioned that
the slight predictive variable of gender on discipline does not
warrant reliance on that variable to alter public policy, much less
to frame a drastic remedy like Kinsler’s to limit the number of
times men can take a bar exam.13
Kinsler not only failed to demonstrate a significant
relationship between multiple bar examination attempts and
ethical violations, but also failed to consider other possible
correlations with bar exam failure and attorney discipline. One
could speculate that there are so many marginally correlated
variables with ethical violations that they lose any predictive
value. For instance, “in 2004, Klein and Bolus reported in a
study of the Texas Bar Examination that applicants who worked
while preparing for the bar examination earned about 15 total
scale score points less than their classmates with comparable

10

See California State Bar Examination Statistics, STATE BAR OF CAL.,
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Admissions/Law-School-Regulation/Exam-Statistics.
During that period, women scored better than men on eight of thirteen exams as
first time test takers and better on eight out of twelve exams as repeat test takers.
Id.
11
Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 18) (agreeing that such
gender differences on bar passage rates do not support changes to bar admission
standards). The professors state, “[E]ven though men are subject to higher discipline
rates, one would not suggest restricting the practice of law based on gender.” Id.
(footnote omitted).
12
Leslie C. Levin et. al., The Questionable Character of the Bar’s Character and
Fitness Inquiry, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 51, 66 (2015).
13
Id. at 52, 62–63, 75–76.
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LSAT scores and LSGPA who were not working.”14 This fact
certainly does not imply that poorer students, who have to work
during bar preparation study, should be denied a chance to
repeat the bar examination.
Nonetheless, Kinsler claims that his data demonstrates that:
(1) [t]he more times it takes a lawyer to pass the bar exam the
more likely that lawyer will be disciplined for ethical violations,
particularly early in the lawyer’s career; and (2) [t]he more
times it takes a lawyer to pass the bar exam the more likely
that lawyer will be disciplined for lack of diligence—including
noncommunication—and/or incompetence.15

The problem, as the following analysis will demonstrate, is
that Kinsler’s empirical data does not support either of his
claims. In addition, in some instances Kinsler’s reliance on his
empirical data is extremely misleading, especially since he
omitted highly relevant data from some of the sources he relies
on.
Kinsler offers specific examples of attorneys he identified
that took the bar exam multiple times and had disciplinary
records within the first twelve years of their careers.16 The
following section demonstrates that Kinsler’s attorney examples
fail to prove any causal relationship between poor bar exam
performance and excessive disciplinary violations by those retakers. A second fatal flaw of Kinsler’s study is that he fails to
establish a correlation between the factual basis for the attorney
disciplinary cases he discusses and the topics actually tested on
the bar examination.
A.

Kinsler Mischaracterized the Specific Cases of Attorney
Discipline That He Used To Support His Hypothesis

1.

The Filer Case Study

One would think that if attorneys who passed the bar exam
after multiple attempts frequently commit ethical violations,
Kinsler would easily find examples to demonstrate his thesis that
poor performance on bar exam topics predicts higher attorney
14

Roger Bolus, Performance Changes on the California Bar Examination: Part
2, STATE BAR OF CAL. 1, 63 (Dec. 20, 2018), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/
documents/admissions/Examinations/Bar-Exam-Report-Final.pdf.
15
Kinsler, supra note 3, at 922.
16
Id. at 893.
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ethical violations. However, the few examples of disciplinary
cases he discusses have little, if any, correspondence to the topics
frequently covered on standard bar examinations.
Kinsler apparently chose to discuss the case of Max D. Filer17
first for dramatic and hyperbolic effect since Filer took the
California Bar Examination forty-eight times,18 even though
Filer’s first ethical violation did not occur until he had practiced
law for ten years.19 Kinsler never discusses the other variables
beyond failing the bar examination that may have contributed to
Filer’s disciplinary action, such as medical or family problems.
Kinsler states that in 2001, ten years after admission, Filer was
disciplined “for not performing competently” and again in 2005
was disciplined for failing “to perform legal services
competently.”20
First, the obvious problem is that the 2005 disciplinary case
occurred outside of Kinsler’s definition of “early career” since it
was in Filer’s fourteenth year of legal practice.21 Second, Kinsler
also failed to demonstrate that Filer’s two disciplinary actions

17
Diane Curtis, Advice from One Who Failed Bar Exam 47 Times: Try Again,
Again and Again, CAL. ST. B. J. (Feb. 2004), http://archive.calbar.ca.gov/archive/
Archive.aspx?articleId=54802&categoryId=54503&month=2&year=2004.
18
Id.
19
Kinsler provides no empirical support for classifying ethical violations more
than a decade after admission to the bar as ones as occurring “early in their legal
careers.” Aditionally, Kinsler could have demonstrated that government or state bar
organizations define the term “early in careers” as a term of art or as a customary
term within the industry. For example, “early career” is defined as the first five
years of a career in determining which scholars qualify for research grants in the
United Kingdom. See Assessment Framework and Guidance on Submissions,
RESEARCH EXCELLENCE FRAMEWORK 1, 19 (July 2011), http://www.fapesp.br/
avaliacao/manuais/ref_guidelines.pdf (stating that for the 2014 Research Excellence
Framework an early career researcher must have started their careers on or after
August 1, 2009). The “early research grants” for the National Institute of Health are
formulated such that “[t]he 7 year eligibility period will be calculated based on the
MM/DD/YYYY the degree was awarded.” Department of Health and Human Services
Part 1. Overview Information, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Feb. 9, 2017) https://grants.
nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/PAR-17-161.html #_3._Additional_Information. The
author has not been able to find a single official definition of “early career” that is
consistent with Kinsler’s expanded definition that includes incidents occurring
during the first twelve years of one’s career. The problem, of course, is that if Kinsler
were to use a more recognized definition of “early career,” the examples of attorney
discipline that he used would not fit as cases of early career disciplinary violations.
20
Kinsler, supra note 3, at 884 & n.12.
21
See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Kinsler, supra note 3, at
883, 884 n.12 (stating Maxcy D. Filer passed the bar in 1991, while he was
disciplined fourteen years later in 2005).
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are correlated to the subjects and skills tested by the California
Bar Examination.
All that Kinsler reports about Filer’s
disciplinary cases was that he was found to have failed “to
perform legal services competently.”22 Kinsler conveniently left
out of his article the actual nature of Filer’s 2001 and 2005
“incompetency” disciplinary cases.
According to the California State Bar, Filer was disciplined
in 2001 for failing to file a proof of service for a client.23 Filer was
found to have violated California Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 3-110(A), which in 1991 stated that “[a] member shall not
intentionally, or with reckless disregard, or repeatedly fail to
perform legal services competently.”24 However, failing to file a
proof of service has little to do with failing the California Bar
Exam. The California Bar Examination does not test the legal
timing for filing a proof of service in a divorce action.25
Filer’s 2005 disciplinary action, which occurred beyond
Kinsler’s own definition of “early career,” was also for failing to
file proof of service.26 Again, although the State Bar found that
Filer failed to perform his legal services “competently,” that
incompetence involved a lack of diligence, not a failure to
understand and implement a topic covered by the California Bar
Examination.27
Kinsler also failed to discuss the facts
surrounding Filer’s 2005 failure to file the proof of service. In
2005, Filer was seventy-four years old and had been ill for
several years, which prevented him from fulfilling his

22

Kinsler, supra note 3, at 884 n.12.
Suspension/Probation, CAL. ST. B. J. (Aug. 2005), http://archive.calbar.ca.gov/
archive/Archive.aspx?articleld=70768&categoryId=70682&month=8&year=2005; see
also The State Bar of Cal. Office of the Chief Trial Counsel Enforcement v. Maxcy D.
Filer, State Bar Court of the State Bar of California, Hearing Department
Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Deposition and Order Approving
Stayed Suspension; No Actual Suspension, filed October 21, 2004 in case number 040-12425, at p. 2. (copy obtained from the State Bar Court in author’s possession).
24
CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-110 (STATE BAR OF CAL. 1989).
25
Scope of the California Bar Examination, STATE BAR OF CAL.,
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Admissions/Examinations/California-Bar-Examination/
California-Bar-Examination-Scope (last visited May 22, 2019).
26
See Suspension/Probation, supra note 23 (discussing Filer’s 2005 violation
and subsequent stipulation).
27
The State Bar of Cal. Office of the Chief Trial Counsel Enforcement v. Maxcy
D. Filer, State Bar Court of the State Bar of California, Hearing Department
Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Deposition and Order Approving
Stayed Suspension; No Actual Suspension, filed October 21, 2004 in case number 040-12425, at p. 2. (copy obtained from the State Bar Court in author’s possession).
23
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professional lawyer duties.28 Although illness is not an excuse for
negligent advocacy, such a failure to file a document while ill has
no correspondence to the bar exam. As it turns out, Kinsler’s
posterchild for the correlation between multiple bar exam
failures and early career disciplinary proceedings was an old man
who wrongfully abandoned a client due in large part to his
illness.
Kinsler, apparently content with using Filer as his
bar-failing, incompetent attorney flag-bearer, decided to keep the
most interesting facts about this lawyer’s life undisclosed. Filer
grew up as a black man who lived “a segregated childhood in
Marianna, Ark[ansas].”29 Filer moved to Compton, California, a
demographically black neighborhood where “[h]e helped organize
and was president of the Compton chapter of the NAACP. He
proudly carried the California flag in the 1963 March on
Washington with Martin Luther King Jr. He later carried the
same flag in King’s funeral procession.”30 Filer served in the U.S.
Navy from 1946 to 1949, and he was a Compton city councilman
from 1976 to 1991.31 Filer tirelessly fought for civil rights in
Compton’s Neighborhood Legal Services office and at the
Community Redevelopment Agency, and he testified at the
McCone Commission regarding the causes and solutions
regarding the Watts Riots.32
Kinsler’s many omissions regarding Filer’s pre- and post-law
degree life, and regarding the factual predicates of his bar
discipline, demonstrate his questionable and methodologically
biased research. He did not discuss the true nature of Filer’s
28
Curtis, supra note 17. See also Maxcy Filer, Persistent Tackler of Bar Exam,
Dies at 80, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE (Jan 11, 2011), http://www.metnews.
com/articles/2011/obit011111.htm. Before the 2005 disciplinary case, Filer “began
having health problems that prevented him from fulfilling his responsibilities.” Id.
29
David Margolick, At the Bar; A Man’s Pride and Persistence Conquer the
California Bar Exam’s Most Famous Losing Streak, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1991),
https://www.nytimes.com/
1991/09/13/news/bar-man-s-pride-persistence-conquer-california-bar-exam-s-mostfamous-losing.html.
30
Curtis, supra note 17.
31
Yussuf J. Simmonds, Maxcy Filer, a Legend . . . STRAIGHT OUTTA
COMPTON, L.A. SENTINEL (Jan. 13, 2011), https://lasentinel.net/maxcy-filer-alegend-straight-outta-compton.html.
32
Id.; Ann M. Simmons, Maxcy Dean Filer dies at 80; ‘Mr. Compton’ served on
City Council and Sought to Empower Blacks, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2011),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2011-jan-15-la-me-maxcy-filer-20110115story.html.
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disciplinary incompetency—failing to file two proofs of service.
He not discuss Filer’s age and health as a possible cause of his
abandoning his client in 2005. He even failed to discuss whether
the California Bar Examination frequently tests the substantive
nature of his ethical violation—failure to file a proof of service.
Kinsler simply did not demonstrate that the Filer case fits his
speculation that failing a bar exam multiple times is correlated
with more disciplinary violations during the first twelve years of
a lawyer’s career.
Kinsler is also silent regarding the impact of his drastic
remedy, which would have prevented attorneys like Filer from
getting a license to practice law. He does not discuss a
cost-benefit analysis between the benefits that Filer provided to
the hundreds of poor clients he represented versus the two
ethical violations that led to his state bar discipline.
2.

The DeZell Case

Kinsler’s second posterchild for multiple bar exam failures
and early disciplinary violations is John DeZell, who passed the
Oregon bar examination on his “tenth attempt.”33 The only
information that Kinsler provides regarding DeZell’s disciplinary
violation is that he “was suspended in 1995 for three years for
neglecting multiple legal matters and incompetence.”34 Kinsler
failed to discuss the factual bases for DeZell’s state bar discipline
and did not even attempt to show a correlation between those
violations and DeZell’s failure of subjects tested on the Oregon
Bar Examination.
DeZell was charged with four disciplinary counts.35 In Count
I, he was alleged to have failed to timely file a complaint and
provide the client with a trust fund accounting.36 In Count II,
DeZell was alleged to have improperly filed a “Notice of Appeal,
one day beyond the statutory deadline” and failed to properly
serve that notice.37 In Count III, he was charged with failure “to
maintain client property in a place of safekeeping, and failed to
promptly pay or deliver to his client funds . . . that she was

33
34
35
36
37

Kinsler, supra note 3, at 883.
Id. at 884 n.12.
In re Dezell, 9 DB Rptr 143, 146–47 (Or. 1995).
Id. at 146.
Id. at 147.
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entitled to receive.”38 Finally, in Count IV, DeZell was charged
with representing two clients where there was a clear conflict of
interest and failing to obtain his clients’ consent to that conflict
of interest.39 Most of DeZell’s ethical violations relate to topics
covered on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam
(“MPRE”), not the bar examination.40
Kinsler’s reference to other attorneys who took the bar
examination multiple times provides no support for his theory.
He includes Paulina Bandy as another example of why states
should have a maximum limit on the number of times applicants
can sit for the bar since she “passed the California bar exam on
her fourteenth attempt.”41 However, Kinsler did not tell the rest
of the story about Ms. Bandy perhaps because it would present a
case of a multi-test taker who did not fit his model of the
negligent or incompetent advocate. What Kinsler left out is that
even though Ms. Bandy took the bar exam fourteen times, during
her “early career,” from 2008 to 2018, she had no state bar
disciplinary actions.42
Kinsler also used the case of Kevin D. Callahan to
demonstrate the absurdity of permitting repeated attempts to
pass a bar exam.
He states that “Callahan failed the
Massachusetts Bar Exam ten times.”43 Again, Kinsler only
presents “straw-man” arguments and does not discuss any facts
in the examples that he uses that could weaken his crusade to rid
the United States of multi-bar examination test takers. What he
did not disclose is that Mr. Callahan was admitted to practice
law in Massachusetts in 1990, but during the twenty-eight years
of Callahan’s legal practice, there are no reports of any
disciplinary proceedings against him.44
38

Id.
Id. at 147–48.
40
See MPRE Subject Matter Outline, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS
(2013), http://www.ncbex.org/pdfviewer/?file=%2Fdmsdocument%2F2.
41
Kinsler, supra note 3, at 901.
42
See Attorney Licensee Profile for Paulina Louise Bandy, License Number
255002, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Licensee/Detail/255002
(last visited June 1, 2019).
43
Kinsler, supra note 3, at 901.
44
At the time of this of writing, neither the Massachusetts Board of Bar
Overseers records database nor the Board’s Disciplinary Decision index has
indicated any history of disciplinary proceedings against Kevin D. Callahan. See
Attorney Licensee Profile For Kevin D. Callahan, Board of Bar Overseers (BBO)
Number 557146, MASS. BD. B. OVERSEERS, https://www.massbbo.org/Attorney
39
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Kinsler presents another attorney, “Marcus Wiggens [who]
passed the California bar exam on his twenty-fourth attempt.”45
The problem, again, is that Wiggens has never had any
disciplinary proceedings during his legal career.46
If Kinsler is correct that there are hundreds of multiple
bar-test taking attorneys who pose a serious danger to the public
because of their poor performance on the bar exam, then why did
he not present examples of those attorneys in his analysis?
3.

Kinsler Failed To Fully Discuss the Connecticut Bar Study
Results on Attorney Discipline

Kinsler cited to two Connecticut State Bar studies of
attorney discipline that attempted to isolate variables that might
have a statistical correlation with attorney misconduct.47 Kinsler
states that “[t]here is also anecdotal and statistical evidence
showing that lawyers who failed the Connecticut Bar Exam were
more likely to face discipline than lawyers who never failed that
exam.”48 However, Kinsler did not present any of the caveats of
the Connecticut studies which undermine his drastic remedy of
limiting bar examination attempts. First, the Connecticut study
found that those who failed the bar exam were more likely to
receive “less severe” discipline rather than “severe discipline.”49
In fact, the Connecticut study found that attorneys who received
severe discipline were academically “somewhat stronger than
those who were less severely disciplined” as more “of the less
severely disciplined lawyers attended a law school ranked in the
bottom half” compared to the severely disciplined lawyers.50
Under Kinsler’s public policy rationale, since academically better
performing students who attended better law schools are a

Lookup?bbonumber=557146 (last visited June 1, 2019); Disciplinary Decisions,
MASS. BD. OF BAR OVERSEERS, https://www.massbbo.org/Decisions (last visited June
1, 2019).
45
Kinsler, supra note 3, at 900.
46
See Attorney Licensee Profile for Marcus B. Wiggins, License Number
272501, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Licensee/Detail/272501
(last visited June 1, 2019).
47
See Kinsler, supra note 3, at 900 n.99.
48
Id. at 900.
49
Levin et al., supra note 12, at 70.
50
Id.
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serious danger to the public, they should not be admitted to the
bar even though they passed the bar examination on their first
attempt.
Kinsler also failed to discuss several other findings in the
Connecticut study that rebut his suppositions:
B.

No Predictive Correlation Between Multi Bar Test Taking and
Disciplinary Action Early in an Attorney’s Career

One of Kinsler’s primary claims is that “early career”
multiple bar test takers commit ethical violations at rates
significantly greater than attorneys who passed the bar exam on
the first or second attempt.51 He structures his argument as
follows:
1. Law students with lesser intellectual abilities perform
worse in law school;
2. Those who do poorly in law school are more likely to fail
the bar exam multiple times;
3. Those who fail the bar exam multiple times are predicted
to commit more ethical violations; and finally,
4. That subset of attorneys are much more likely to commit
their ethical violations early in their careers.52
The problem is that Kinsler failed to discuss the empirical
data contained in the Connecticut study that rebuts his attorney
discipline predictive model. First, that study found that LSAT
scores have no correlation with attorney discipline.53
The
Connecticut study rebuts Kinsler’s intuition that academically
weaker students are predicted to commit statistically
significantly more ethical violations.54 In addition, the study
found that attending a low-ranked law school had almost no
correlation with predictive ethical violations and only increased
the likelihood of discipline by “1.7 percentage points.”55
The Connecticut study also rebuts Kinsler’s temporal
predictive model in which he claims that “lawyers who repeatedly
fail the bar exam are more likely to be disciplined for
incompetence early in their legal careers.”56 What Kinsler did

51
52
53
54
55
56

Kinsler, supra note 3, at 885.
Id.
Levin et al., supra note 12, at 67.
Id.
Id.
Kinsler, supra note 3, at 892.

2019] BAR PASSAGE RATES AND ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

55

not include in his analysis is that the Connecticut study found
that for all disciplined attorneys the average time between
admission to the bar and a disciplinary sanction was 10.7 years.57
In other words, the Connecticut study did not find that length of
time practicing law was a variable that correlated with
distinctions among attorney disciplinary records.
C.

Kinsler Stacks the Empirical Deck by Overgeneralizing the
Categories of Ethical Misconduct He Relies on in His Attempt
To Prove a Cause and Effect Relationship Between the
Number of Bar Exams Taken and Attorney Incompetence

Kinsler defines two types of attorney misconduct that he is
investigating.
First, he defines “client neglect” as both
“non-diligence and failure to communicate.”58
His second
category is “competence” or “incompetence.”59 The problem is
that Kinsler never defines the term competence and often just
lumps and cumulates statistics on what he terms “neglect and/or
incompetence.”60 Consequently, it is impossible to track the
different types of misconduct or the cause and effect and/or
correlations among his data and the skills and substantive
knowledge actually tested on bar examinations. This is a fatal
methodological flaw because it substantially exaggerates the
number of disciplinary cases correlated with subjects tested on
bar examinations.
However, Kinsler does outline the skills inherent in the
definition of “competency” under Rule 1.1:
1. specific knowledge about the fields of law in which the
lawyer practices;
2. performance of the techniques of practice with skill;
3. identification of areas beyond the lawyer’s competence
and bringing those areas to the client’s attention;
4. proper preparation; and
5. attention to details and schedules necessary to assure
that the matter undertaken is completed with no
avoidable harm to the client’s interest.61

57
58
59
60
61

Levin et al., supra note 12, at 61.
Kinsler, supra note 3, at 886.
Id. at 884–85, 891–92, 895, 898, 922.
Id. at 898.
Id. at 891 (quoting N.H. R. RPC Rule 1.1(b)).
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He next claims that the skills required under Rule 1.1
competency are the same as those tested on the bar exam:
1. Recognition, characterization and articulation of the
issues;
2. Analysis and evaluation of the facts presented in the
light of those issues;
3. Recognition and statement of the rules, standards or
principles of law pertinent to those issues, including
qualifications and limitations;
4. Application of the law to the facts and reasoning to a
sound conclusion; and
5. Coherent communication of such analysis and
reasoning.62

What Kinsler apparently fails to understand is that state bar
disciplinary boards and courts do not use the terms “competent,”
“competency,” or “incompetency” when referring to only acts or
omissions solely related to the five areas that Kinsler admits are
tested on the bar examination. As was demonstrated in Part I,
almost all of the cases that Kinsler presented as examples of
attorneys’ lack of competence were in reality cases in which an
attorney failed to perform an act, such as filing a court document.
However, such issues like client neglect are not subjects included
in the five categories Kinsler states are tested on the bar
examination. In fact, the fifth category that Kinsler lists as an
example of incompetent lawyering under Rule 1.1, “attention to
details and schedules necessary to assure that the matter
undertaken is completed with no avoidable harm to the client’s
interest,”63 is not even listed by Kinsler as a topic covered on bar
examinations.
The most common areas of attorney discipline—failure to
properly communicate with clients, trust fund violations, drug
and alcohol violations, and misrepresentation64—are rarely
62

Id. at 892.
Id. at 891. (quoting N.H. R. RPC Rule 1.1(b)).
64
For instance, in Tennessee from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2018, neglect
and failure to communicate with clients constituted between fifty-two percent and
fifty-eight percent of disciplinary cases, relationships with clients and courts were
nine to ten percent, trust violations were eight percent, and misrepresentation and
fraud were eight percent. 36th Annual Discipline Report, TENN. BD. OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY (2016–2017), at 5, http://www.tbpr.org/news-publications/annualreports [hereinafter 36th Annual Discipline Report]; 37th Annual Discipline Report,
TENN. BD. PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (2017-2018), at 3, http://www.tbpr.org/newspublications/annual-reports [hereinafter 37th Annual Discipline Report].
63
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tested on the bar examination, as opposed to on the MPRE ethics
exam.
And when tested on the bar exam, professional
responsibility issues comprise a very small percentage of the
points on bar examination questions. It is odd that Kinsler,
Anderson, and Muller did not use the MPRE to determine
whether there is a correlation between low scores on that test
and patterns of attorney discipline rather than relying on data
from the general bar examination.65
The California State Bar has published previous test
questions and sample answers from the July 2012 through the
July 2018 bar examinations.66 After analyzing each of the dozens
of California Bar Examination essay questions and suggested
answers from that period, it is clear that the exam almost never
tests the substance of the types of ethical violations relied on by
Kinsler as proof of a connection between bar exam failure and
higher disciplinary rates.67 In addition, if a bar exam question
tests disciplinary issues discussed by Kinsler such as the failure
to perform a required act, the points value of such an issue is
very slight in relation to the total points for each question and is
very minimal in relation to all of the subjects and questions on
that bar examination.68 For instance, the topic of trust account
65

See Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 15) (admitting that the
“relationship between scores on the multistate professional responsibility exam
(MPRE) and career discipline rates is also worth investigating”).
66
The California Bar maintains a database of previous examination questions
and sample answers. Past Exams, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/
Admissions/Examinations/California-Bar-Examination/Past-Exams#examquestions
(last visited June 1, 2019).
67
Id.
68
For instance, one question on California’s February 2012 exam concerned
professional responsibility. Id. However, that question only concerned illegal
attorney advertising, witness fees, client solicitation, and fee sharing, which are not
topics included in Kinsler’s examples of attorney discipline. Id. The July 2012 exam
had a short question on professional responsibility regarding attorneys entering
business deals with clients and unconscionable attorney fees. Id. The February 2013
exam had a question addressing the duty of fairness, confidentiality, and duty to
communicate. Id. The July 2013 exam had issues involving the duty to have
expertise in the substantive area of a client’s case, the formation of the attorneyclient relationship, fees, confidentiality and communication, improper influence and
perjury. Id. The February 2014 exam had issues involving press releases, the duty of
a prosecutor, lack of candor, discovery, and ex parte communications. Id. The July
2014 exam contained issues of the scope of representation, fairness to opposing
counsel, loyalty, candor, and confidentiality. Id. The February 2015 had no
professional responsibility issues. Id. The July 2015 exam tested loyalty, care, and
fiduciary duties to clients. Id. The February 2016 exam concerned sexual relations
with clients, loyalty, expertise in subject area of representation, forcing clients to
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violations, the leading ground for ethical discipline in California,
was tested on only one question during the fourteen different bar
exams administered from 2012 through 2018.69 Furthermore, I
was unable to find a single question that focused on an attorney’s
failure to file an action within the statute of limitations, one of
the types of disciplinary actions significantly relied on by Kinsler.
Moreover, that is the heart of the matter in Kinsler’s
research. Most of the cases he cites relate to a type of
competency—lack of diligence—used by disciplinary tribunals
and infrequently tested on bar examinations.70
Therefore,
Kinsler’s data provides no empirical connection between most
types of disciplinary cases and attorneys’ lack of skills as tested
on a bar examination.
The problem is that when Kinsler refers to or analyzes
attorney disciplinary cases in which he illustrates attorney
“incompetency,” he never specifies the acts that led a state bar to
discipline the attorney. He does not discuss whether that finding
of incompetency correlates with one or more of the five areas of
competency tested on the bar exam. Kinsler recognizes that
some instances of attorney neglect are classified as incompetency
cases by state bar disciplinary codes even though that finding of
incompetency has no relationship to the five types of

waive their rights, court appearances, trust funds, and fee agreements. Id. The July
2016 exam tested formation of an attorney client relationship, corporations as
clients, loyalty, conflicts, knowledge of substantive law, confidentiality and candor.
Id. The February 2017 exam involved issues of loyalty, withdrawal, frivolousness,
fees, communication, investigation, returning client’s property. Id. The July 2017
exam tested privilege, work product, fees, confidentiality, fairness, loyalty, and
withdrawal. Id. The February 2018 exam included issues of candor, false testimony,
and attorney as a witness. Id. The July 2018 exam tested loyalty, conflicts,
substantive expertise, confidentiality, and fees. Id.
69
See California Bar Exam February 2016, STATE BAR OF CAL.,
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/admissions/Examinations/February20
16CBX_Questions_R.pdf.
70
For instance, in 2017 in New Jersey the disciplinary cases involved the
following factual violations: (1) dishonesty, fraud, and misrepresentation: 16.7%;
(2) criminal convictions: 16%; (3) misappropriation of client funds: 15.4%; (4) trust
fund violations: 10.3%; (5) gross neglect and incompetence: 9%; (6) conflict of
interest: 6.4%; (7) non-cooperation with bar proceedings: 5.1%; (8) fee violations:
4.5%; (9) lack of communication: 3.8%; (10) ineligible practice of law: 3.8%; and
(11) unauthorized practice of law: 2.6%. 2017 State of the Attorney Disciplinary
System Report, SUPREME COURT OF N.J. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS, at 13–17,
https://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/oae/2017oaeannualrpt.pdf?cacheID=aNU1
La.
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incompetency tested on the bar exam.71 Therefore, he admits
that some incompetency disciplinary cases bear no relationship
with the bar examination and do not provide support for his
claims that multiple bar examination test takers’ ethics
violations are predicted by bar exam performance.
The author has not been able to find any evidence that
attorney incompetence based on Kinsler’s five areas of bar
examination testing comprise even a small percentage of
attorney discipline cases nationally.72 For instance, I searched
for all disciplinary cases published on the Alabama State Bar
database that contain the words “competent,” “competency,”
“incompetent,” or “incompetency,” and found that only nine
disciplinary cases were reported.73
In the first case, on
September 4, 2018, an attorney was reprimanded for failing to
timely file an appellate brief.74 Although the attorney was found
to have acted incompetently, that incompetence does not fit
under Kinsler’s five state bar exam tested areas. In the second
case, on May 20, 2013, an attorney was found incompetent for
making false statements to the court, misappropriating client
funds, failing to attend hearings, and practicing outside his
substantive expertise. 75 Based on my own study of the California
71

Kinsler, supra note 3, at 891.
In some State Bar Organization reports on attorney discipline the category of
“incompetent” or “incompetence” is not even used. For instance, each year the
Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility issues an annual Disciplinary Report
that charts the types of disciplinary infractions litigated by the Board that year. In
the July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2018 and July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017
reports, the Board does not even include a category for incompetency. See 37th
Annual Discipline Report, supra note 64; 36th Annual Discipline Report, supra note
64. Instead, the Board reported that of the complaints received in 2017 and 2018,
fifty-two percent involved “neglect or failure to communicate;” eight percent were
“trust violations;” eight percent were “misrepresentation or fraud;” six percent were
for “fees;” two percent were “criminal convictions;” four percent were for “conflict of
interest;” nine percent were disputes over “relationship with client or court;” and two
percent were for “personal behavior.” 37th Annual Discipline Report, supra note 64,
at 5. The July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017 statistics were very similar and did not
include any specific data on incompetency. 36th Annual Discipline Report, supra
note 64.
73
On October 23, 2018, I searched for variations of the word “incompetence” in
Alabama State Bar’s disciplinary case database. Only nine results were found.
Discipline History, ALA. STATE BAR, http://alabar.org/resources/office-of-generalcounsel/disciplinary-history (last searched Oct. 23, 2018).
74
Id. (searching keywords “appellate brief” and “timely file” together) (last
accessed Mar. 1, 2019).
75
Id. (searching keywords “false statements” and “misappropriated” together)
(last accessed Mar. 1, 2019).
72
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Bar Examination, these topics, such as substantive expertise,
were not frequently tested; other state bar examinations may be
similarly situated. In the third case, on October 9, 2013, the
Alabama State Bar reprimanded an attorney for “failing to
provide competent representation to [a] client” because the
attorney “failed to timely file an application for rehearing.”76
Again, this incompetency does not involve a bar exam tested area
of law. In the fourth case, the lawyer, on April 1, 2014, was
found to have “fail[ed] to provide competent representation as he
did not possess a license to practice law in the other state and
failed to appear at the client’s arraignment.”77 Again, this is not
a bar exam topic. In the fifth case, on January 9, 2015, a lawyer
was found to be incompetent because he was under the influence
of narcotics during the representation.78 In the sixth case, on
March 13, 2015, an attorney was reprimanded because he failed
to file a witness list, failed to take a deposition, and failed to file
any motions for his client.79 Again, these are not bar tested
areas. In the seventh case, on January 8, 2016, an attorney was
reprimanded for incompetence because he filed the wrong
immigration form for his client.80 In the eighth case, on January
19, 2016, an attorney was found incompetent for appointing an
incorrect person as an estate’s personal representative and for
withdrawing from the case without refunding the clients’ fee or
correcting his error.81 Again, these are not bar exam topics.
Finally, in the ninth case, on June 25, 2018, an attorney was
found incompetent for filing documents “containing erroneous
information” and he “filed a deed contrary to an order issued by
the Court.”82 Again, the ninth case, like the other eight examples
of disciplinary actions in Alabama, did not involve any of
76

Id. (searching keywords “competent representation”) (last accessed Mar. 25,

2019).
77
Id. (searching minimum date field for “Apr. 1, 2014,” then searching
maximum date field for “Apr. 1, 2014,” and searching keyword/exact phrase field for
“competent”) (last accessed Mar. 25, 2019).
78
Id. (searching minimum date field for “Jan. 9, 2015,” then searching
maximum date field for “Jan. 9, 2015,” and searching keyword/exact phrase field for
“competent”) (last accessed Mar. 25, 2019).
79
Id. (search minimum date field for “Mar. 13, 2015,” then searching maximum
date field for “Mar. 13, 2015,” and searching keyword/exact phrase field for
“competence”) (last accessed Mar. 25, 2019).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
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Kinsler’s five areas of bar examination testing. Even so, these
cases would likely have been included in his research since at
first blush they fit into his category of “non-diligence and/or
incompetence.”
Kinsler’s failure to define and distinguish cases of neglect
from cases of incompetence regarding bar exam tested skills and
substance makes it impossible for him to demonstrate that his
empirical evidence proves a cause and effect or correlative
relationship between multiple bar exam failures and attorney
discipline. The following hypothetical illustrates this critical
methodological error: assume that a researcher studied attorney
misconduct cases in California for a decade. She reports that she
found one hundred cases in which young career attorneys who
took the bar exam multiple times were disciplined for neglect
and/or incompetence. She does not disclose the actual acts that
led to discipline or how many specific cases involved neglect and
the number of cases that involved incompetence related to
subjects frequently tested on the bar.
Does her data prove causation and/or correlation between
bar exam failure and attorney discipline? It clearly does not. To
demonstrate that relationship, the researcher must also
demonstrate that the acts that led to disciplinary action are
related to subjects and skills tested on the bar exam.
Kinsler undermines his own research in two ways. First, he
admits that client neglect forms more than fifty percent of
attorney disciplinary cases and no other category of attorney
misconduct, including incompetence, comprises more than ten
percent.83 Since issues of attorneys’ neglect in communicating
with clients and failures to perform tasks are not frequently
tested on the bar exam, those cases must be excluded from the
data set used to show causation and/or correlation. In our
hypothetical, by applying Kinsler statistics, on average, only 10
of the 100 cases she studied involve incompetence as opposed to
neglect. Second, to demonstrate causation and/or correlation, the
hypothetical researcher must identify the nature of the ten
incompetency disciplinary cases she studied. Unless she can tie
those specific types of incompetency cases to the subjects and
skills tested by the bar exam, she cannot demonstrate that

83

Kinsler, supra note 3, at 885–86.
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failing the bar exam predicts or is correlated with disciplinary
actions.
Kinsler’s specific study of Tennessee bar disciplinary cases
also has dual empirical flaws: (1) failure to properly categorize
and itemize his two chosen types of attorney discipline, “client
neglect” and “incompetency;” and (2) failure to demonstrate that
those few cases involving “incompetency” are related to subjects
and skills tested on the Tennessee bar exam.
First, his study only analyzes sixty-nine attorneys who failed
the Tennessee bar examination multiple times between 2005 and
2014 and who were disciplined within two to twelve years after
admission.84 Ironically, the most obvious empirical weakness,
small sample size, is not the weakest part of Kinsler’s
methodological design. The more serious empirical flaw is that
he did not provide a shred of evidence that any of the sixty-nine
cases of attorney discipline involved acts related to subjects or
skills tested on the Tennessee bar examination. In fact, he listed
thirteen different types of ethical violations that resulted in those
sixty-nine attorneys being disciplined.85 Only one of those factual
types of ethical violations, “incompetence,” might have a
correlation with the bar exam. I say “might” have a correlation
with the bar exam because Kinsler did not provide any
quantitative or qualitative information about the category of
“incompetence” cases he relies on. He did not provide how many
of the sixty-nine attorneys were found to be incompetent and did
not describe the facts surrounding any of the cases in which the
State Bar found an attorney incompetent. It is statistically
impossible to determine whether there is any correlation between
failing the bar, ethical violations, and early stages of attorneys’
careers in Kinsler’s data and analysis.

84

Id. at 893–94.
Id. at 895. The categories of attorney discipline listed include
neglect, failure to communicate with clients and/or opposing counsel,
failure to file court papers, incompetence, failure to perform work as
promised, misrepresentation of the status of a case to clients, failure to
timely file or refile a case, failure to attend meetings, failure to attend court
on behalf of clients, failure to notify clients of the attorney’s suspension,
failure to protect client interests, failure to respond to the BOPR, and
abandonment of the attorney’s practice.
Id. (emphasis added).
85
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D. Kinsler Failed To Consider the Social Justice Aspects of His
National Rule for the Maximum Number of Bar Examination
Attempts
Equally troubling is Kinsler’s silence on the social justice
results of his proposed national rule that law students can take
the bar exam a maximum of three attempts.86 Kinsler did not
even discuss the disparate impact on the following groups:
(1) test takers in jurisdictions with extremely high MBE cut
scores87 and with historically low bar passage rates; and
(2) diversity candidates.
1.

Disparate Impact on Bar Test Takers in High MBE Cut
Score States

Kinsler’s analysis assumes that there is something termed
“the bar exam.” Kinsler neglects that passage rates on the many
forms of the bar examinations are largely determined by each
state’s chosen MBE cut score. A simple comparison between the
bar examination MBE cut scores and passage rates of Tennessee,
the state he chose for his empirical study, and California, one of
the most difficult bar examination passage cut scores,
demonstrates how unwise and discriminatory his proposal is to
limit bar examination test administrations based solely on
pass/fail statistics.
Kinsler states that the bar passage rate in Tennessee for
first time takers from 2005 to 2014 was 87.76%.88 In comparison,
the ABA first-time taker passage rate for California applicants
during those years was only 73.75%.89 A 14.01% mean lower bar
passage rate in California can be primarily explained by the
differential in MBE cut scores between the two states.90 The
86

Id. at 920. Kinsler suggests that a fourth attempt might be warranted based
on the applicant’s earlier test results. Id. at 921.
87
“The Multistate Bar Examination (MBE) is a six-hour, 200-question multiplechoice examination developed by NCBE [National Conference of Bar Examiners] and
administered by user jurisdictions as part of the bar examination.” Multistate Bar
Examination, NAT’L CONF. OF B. EXAM’RS, http://www.ncbex.org/exams/mbe/. Each
state determines its own bar examination MBE cut (passing) score.
88
Id. at 894.
89
STATE BAR OF CAL., supra note 10. Since California permits non-ABA
accredited students to sit for the bar exam, this data only includes students who
graduated from ABA accredited schools who took the California Bar Examination as
a first time taker.
90
The California bar has recently modified its bar passage statistical model and
rates will now result in an approximately 0.5% increase because they will no longer
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MBE cut score in Tennessee is only 135 but California’s cut score
is 144.91 Why is Kinsler’s failure to include such disparate state
bar passage standards and passage rates in his model so critical?
The reason is that he uses bar passage as the sole criteria for
predicting early career attorney disciplinary violations. But, the
problem is that one cannot draw the same conclusions about a
bar applicant failing an easy, or lower MBE cut score, bar exam
versus the failure of a student to pass a much more difficult bar
examination, or higher MBE cut score exam.
In a recent article, I demonstrated that even though students
attending the bottom quartile of California ABA approved law
schools have a very poor first time passage rate on the California
Bar Examination because of the 144 MBE cut score, most of
those students scored well enough on the MBE portion of the
exam to have passed the bar examination in almost every other
state.92 For instance, consider one example, Southwestern Law
School. The mean MBE cut score among the states is 134.93
From February 2007 through July 2014, a similar period as
studied by Kinsler in his Tennessee study, Southwestern
students scored substantially higher than the national mean of
133.94 In fact, Southwestern students scored between 138 and
147.7 on the MBE even though their passage rates on the

count students who do not complete the test or who score lower than forty on a
question as test takers who failed the exam. Derek T. Muller, A Change in
Calculating Pass Rates for the California Bar Exam, EXCESS DEMOCRACY (Dec. 5,
2017), http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2017/12/a-change-in-calculating-pass-ratesfor-the-california-bar-exam.
91
See Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS & THE AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, (2018), at 33–34, http://www.ncbex.org/pubs/baradmissions-guide/2018/mobile/index.html#p=1.
92
See generally William Wesley Patton, A Blueprint for a Fairer ABA Standard
for Judging Law Graduates’ Competence: How a Standard Based on Students’ Scores
in Relation to the National Mean MBE Score Properly Balances Consumer Safety
with Increased Diversity in the Bar, 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 3
(2017). Part of that article relied on Professor Anderson’s earlier study that
demonstrated that California’s fourth-tier law schools’ mean MBE scores on the
California Bar Examination would have resulted in those students passing the New
York State Bar Examination at rates between fifty-seven and eighty-three percent.
Robert Anderson, California Law School Bar Passage Rates Recalculated for the
New York Bar, WITNESSETH: LAW, DEALS, & DATA (Dec. 19, 2016),
http://witnesseth.typepad.com/blog/2016/12/california-law-school-bar-passage-ratesrecalculated-for-the-new-york-bar.html.
93
Patton, supra note 92, at 12.
94
Id. at 31–32.

2019] BAR PASSAGE RATES AND ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

65

California Bar Examination ranged during that examination
period from a low of fifty-three percent to a high of seventy-four
percent.95 What is equally surprising is that from 2007 through
2014, the Southwestern students’ MBE scores would have passed
all states’ bar exams in some years, and even during their worst
bar year performance they would have passed all state bar exams
except for Alaska, California, Delaware, Nevada, Oregon and
Virginia, states with the highest MBE cut scores in the nation.96
Kinsler’s multiple test taking, incompetency, and
disciplinary violation model simply does not work. He cannot
possibly argue that students who fail the California Bar
Examination, but who would pass almost all other bar exams
based on their MBE scores, are incompetent without declaring
that most other states are admitting incompetent attorneys who
passed those states’ bar examinations on the first attempt, but
with lower MBE scores than California’s 144 cut score. Kinsler
has not provided a shred of evidence to support his proposition
that students who have to take the California bar exam multiple
times and whose MBA scores would predict passage of almost
every other state exam are more likely to commit disciplinary
acts and endanger the public early in their careers. Yet, he
advocates for limiting these test takers to a maximum of three or
four bar exam administrations to become a California attorney.
2.

The Kinsler Proposal’s Effect on Diversity in the Bar

States with very high MBE cut scores and with large
minority populations, like California, have a very low percentage
of minority lawyers in relation to the minority state population.
The United States Census states that the percentage of
Hispanics in California increased from 32.4% in 2000 to 37.6% in
2010,97 and comprised 38.9% of the California population in
2016.98 According to the California State Bar Association,
95

Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
97
SHARON R. ENNIS ET AL., THE HISPANIC POPULATION: 2010, 6 (2011),
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-04.pdf (citing U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, Census 2000 Summary File 1; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 Census
Summary File 1).
98
Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Race, and Hispanic
Origin for the United States, States, and Counties: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2016, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (June 2017), https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/
pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk.
96
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Hispanics comprised 3% of California’s attorneys in 1991, 3.7% in
2001, and 3.8% in 2006.99 In 2011, the most recent survey,
Hispanics comprised only 4.2% of California attorneys.100 As of
June 1, 2019, there are currently 189,846 attorneys licensed to
practice law in California.101 But, based on the 2011 survey
results, only 7,837, or 4.2%, are Hispanic attorneys despite the
fact that there are approximately 14,013,719 Hispanics living in
California.102
Adopting Kinsler’s recommendation of allowing a maximum
of three bar examination attempts will exacerbate the already
minimal diversity in the California bar because although some
minority bar test takers have a low first-time passage rate, after
several administrations, their passage rate substantially
increases on the California exam.103
Several bar exam
test-taking persistence studies indicate that many minority bar
candidates benefit from having multiple attempts at passing the
bar exam, especially those students who take bar exams in states
with very high MBE cut scores.104 For instance, a study by Klein

99
See Final Report of Results Member Services Survey February 2006, STATE
BAR OF CAL. 12, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/reports/2006_StateBar-Survey.pdf? ver=2017-05-19-134112-167 (providing the demographic makeup of
the California State Bar); see also Final Report California Bar Journal Survey
September 10, 2001, STATE BAR
OF CAL. 2, https://www.calbarjournal.com/Portals/1/documents/2001-CBJ-SurveySummary.pdf (indicating that the growth in California State Bar membership
among Hispanics from 1991 to 2001 was smaller than the growth rate among
Asians).
100
See Summary Results Survey of Members of the State Bar of California
December, 2011,
STATE BAR OF CAL. 8 http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/
documents/reports/2011-12_SBCdemosurvey_sumandfacts.pdf
(indicating
the
percentage of California State Bar members amongst the 1,820 survey respondents
that categorized their “ethnic or racial background” as “Latino/Hispanic”). But see id.
at 10 (explaining that “the margin of sampling error would be approximately plus or
minus three percent, with a confidence level of 95 percent,” and that “[t]he margin of
sampling error for subgroups of respondents is higher than it is for the overall
results”).
101
See Licensee Demographics, STATE BAR OF CAL., https://members.calbar.ca.
gov/search/demographics.aspx (providing the population of active attorneys that are
licensed members of the California bar).
102
See ENNIS ET AL., supra note 97, at 6 (listing the Hispanic or Latino
population for California as found in the 2010 census).
103
Patton, supra note 92, at 52–56.
104
See generally Stephen P. Klein & Roger Bolus, Initial and Eventual Passing
Rates of July 2004 First Timers of Texas Bar Exam, TEX. BD. OF LAW EXAM’RS
(2006), https://ble.texas.gov/klein-report-0606 [hereinafter Klein & Bolus, Texas July
2004]; Stephen P. Klein & Roger Bolus, A Comparison of Initial and Eventual
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and Bolus compared minority test taker passage rates on the
California bar examination according to the number of
administrations of the exam they attempted.105 The study of
minority persistence and ultimate bar-passage rates on the
California Bar Examination compared the ultimate bar
examination passage rates among cohort test takers that took
the exam up to three times, up to five times, and up to seven
times.106 The study found the following ultimate minority
bar-passage rates based upon the number of times students
repeated the examination:
SUCCESS RATES PER MULTIPLE BAR EXAM ATTEMPTS107
All Hispanic
1977 Exam 1982 Exam
(Up to 7
(Up to 3
Exams)
Exams)
Eventual
Pass
Percentage

80%

54%

All Black
1977 Exam 1982 Exam
(Up to 3
(Up to 7
Exams)
Exams)
64%

38%

Table 1 demonstrates the significantly higher ultimate
bar-passage rates for Hispanic and black law students in
California based on the number of opportunities to take the test.
The Hispanic and black ultimate passage rates for both groups
increased by twenty-six percent when up to seven repeat
examinations were calculated rather than only including three
bar administrations.108 The Klein and Bolus study demonstrates
that under Kinsler’s maximum of three or four bar
administrations, fewer minority test takers will become members
of the California bar.109
Passing Rates on the California Bar Examination, PR-87-5 (Oct. 30, 1987)
[hereinafter Klein & Bolus, California 1987].
105
Klein & Bolus, California 1987, supra note 104, at ii.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
A second study by Klein and Bolus demonstrated that minority candidates in
states with lower MBE cut scores and with higher annual bar passage rates than
those in California need fewer examination attempts to pass the exam. See Klein &
Bolus, Texas July 2004, supra note 104, at 6.
109
The NCBE published a minority multiple test taker study that analyzed the
July 2006 and 2007 California Bar Examinations. See Douglas Ripkey & Susan
Case, Exploration of MBE Attempt Patterns: July 2006 and July 2007 First-Taker
Groups, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS, at 2, https://www.americanbar.org/
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The bottom line is that Kinsler’s study is significantly
methodologically flawed and proposes a drastic remedy that is
empirically unsupported and inconsistent with reasonably
providing increased access to justice.
II. THE ANDERSON AND MULLER STUDY
Analyzing Anderson and Muller’s study is important because
there is a cross-pollination between their article and Kinsler’s.110
The following section demonstrates some of the methodological
and policy flaws in their article.
Professors Anderson and Muller recently concluded that
there is a connection between bar passage scores and the
probability of state bar discipline, and that lowering the MBE cut
score in California will result in an explosion of attorney

content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council
_reports_and_resolutions/March2016CouncilOpenSessionMaterials/2016_march__nc
be_persistance_data_recent.pdf. That study found that approximately 14.5% of black
students took the July 2006 California Bar Examination four or more times and
approximately 9% of Hispanic students took that exam four or more times. Id. For a
detailed analysis of the many methodological flaws of the Ripkey and Case
persistence study, see Memorandum from William Wesley Patton, Professor
Emeritus, Whittier Law School, Assistant Clinical Vol Professor, UCLA David
Geffen School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, to the American Bar
Association Council (July 24, 2016) https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and
_resolutions/comments/201607_comment_s316_william_patton_8.pdf. That analysis
demonstrates that the NCBE study is methodologically flawed because its use of
MBE administrations is an inaccurate statistical prediction of the number of times
students actually sit for the bar exam. Id. The NCBE study substantially
underestimated the number of students who actually took the July 2006 and 2007
bar exam. Id. For another study demonstrating the flaws of using the MBE as a
proxy for the number of bar exam test takers, see Gary S. Rosin, Comments on LookBack Periods and Eventual Bar Passage Rates, 3 (July 31, 2012),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2121116. The NCBE has recently admitted that it only has
ethnicity data for about sixty percent of MBE test takers and that it has “limited
information on whether a given examinee is retaking the MBE.” Mark A. Albanese,
The Testing Column February 2018: The MBE Storm Surge Continues, 87 B.
EXAMINER, at 27–28. In addition, the NCBE admits that because the Uniform Bar
Examination (UBE) permits candidates to transfer their MBE scores to other states,
they do not actually know how many students repeat the MBE. Id. at 28. “In 2017
alone, approximately 3,700 individuals transferred their UBE scores to another UBE
jurisdiction—individuals who might otherwise have retaken the MBE.” Id. at 32.
110
Kinsler relies on the Anderson and Muller study, and Anderson and Muller
also rely on Kinsler’s study. See Kinsler, supra note 3, at 900 n.100; Anderson &
Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 13 n.37).
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disciplinary and legal malpractice cases.111 However, unlike
Kinsler, Anderson and Muller discuss many of the problems and
limitations inherent in their research. Most importantly, they
admit that they are uncertain regarding the importance of that
relationship between the bar exam and attorney discipline. They
begin by proclaiming that there is a significant relationship,112
but as the paper progresses, they admit that the relationship
may not be significant and that the predictive power of bar
examination performance which they term the “magnitude of the
effect[,] may be larger or smaller than [they] estimate.”113
Anderson and Muller’s study contains the following
limitations and methodological weaknesses:
1. Their “analysis is limited due to the imperfect data
available . . .;”114
2. They “do not have access to the bar exam scores of these
attorneys. Accordingly, [they] use proxies . . .;”115
3. Their results require “numerous assumptions that [they]
believe are reasonable but may not ultimately reflect the
true relationships” among LSAT, bar scores, and attorney
discipline;116 and
4. “[A]lthough [their] model relies on aggregate (and noisy)
data, it gives roughly accurate predictions of the
individual data we do have.”117
Unfortunately, Anderson and Muller fail to adequately
address the most obvious questions: if lowering MBE cut scores
substantially increases attorney discipline and endangers the
public, why have the forty-eight states that have substantially
lower MBE cut scores than California not experienced the
explosion in disciplinary cases that they predict? Also, why have
states like Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington
recently lowered their MBE cut scores if such a change threatens

111
Since the publication of their piece, Anderson and Muller have each
responded to criticism regarding the validity of their analysis, methodology, and
conclusions. In this section, I discuss the significant criticism of their article and
Professor Anderson’s confusing responses.
112
See Anderson and Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3).
113
Id. (manuscript at 14).
114
Id. (manuscript at 3).
115
Id. (manuscript at 6).
116
Id. (manuscript at 10) (emphasis added).
117
Id. (manuscript at 12–13) (emphasis added).
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their public safety?118 Finally, why have the media and the
public in states with much lower MBE cut scores not zealously
fought to increase the MBE cut score to protect the public from
the onslaught of predicted attorney malpractice?
A.

States with a 133 MBE Cut Score Have Not Experienced the
Attorney Disciplinary Increase Predicted by Anderson and
Muller

Anderson and Muller predict that if California lowered its
MBE cut score from 144 to 133 there would be at least a 10%
increase in the chances of an attorney with that MBE bar exam
score of being disciplined during a thirty-five year career—a
1,330 pass score would predict a 19% chance of discipline versus
a 9% chance for a passing score of 1,440.119 If their data and
predictions are accurate, the disciplinary rates in jurisdictions
with a 1,330 pass score should be at least 10% higher than those
in California. Instead of testing their research and hypothesis in
jurisdictions with a 133 MBE cut score—Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Jersey, New
York, and South Carolina120—they took the easy way out by
citing two law review articles that they say support their
conclusion that “[c]ross-state comparisons may have little value
due to disparities in state bar disciplinary procedures,
enforcement, and priorities.”121 Their two referenced articles do
not sufficiently support Anderson and Muller’s conclusion that
conducting cross-state comparisons of attorney disciplinary

118

Stephanie Francis Ward, California Sees Increase in Pass Rates for July 2017
Despite Denying Requests to Lower Cut Score, ABA J. (Nov. 20, 2017),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/california_increase_bar_exam_pass_rate_jul
y; Sawsan Morrar, Should State Adopt Lower Passing Score for the Bar Exam?
Current One May Harm Students of Color, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.sacbee.com/latest-news/article223879635.html.
119
Anderson and Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 9). Under state bar
grading, the MBE cut score 133, for instance, is scaled to a final score of 1330.
120
Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements 2017, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS & THE AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, (2017), at 30–31, https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/ComprehensiveGuidetoBarAdmi
ssions/2017_comp_guide_web.authcheckdam.pdf.
121
Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 17 n.45) (citing Debra Moss
Curtis, Attorney Discipline Nationwide: A Comparative Analysis of Process and
Statistics, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 209 (2011); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and
Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73 (1997)).
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statistics has “little value.”122 For instance, their reliance on
Professor Curtis’s article is misplaced. In her article, she merely
noted that “finding this [bar exam disciplinary] information in
one place to make comparisons among states and of lawyers
licensed in multiple jurisdictions is difficult.”123 Curtis then
spent more than one hundred pages providing comparative state
attorney disciplinary statistics.124 Curtis would probably be
surprised that Anderson and Muller, who rely on her data, find
her study of “little value.”
In addition, the other article cited by Anderson and Muller
on the futility of comparing state disciplinary systems actually
undercuts some of their rationale for failing to look at other
states’ disciplinary patterns. In that article, Professor Moulton
states that “[t]he point is that we should be careful not to
exaggerate the extent to which the substance of lawyer conduct
standards varies among the states. Most states’ rules are close to
identical in substance if not in precise language.”125 Therefore,
disciplinary statistics among states are not significantly skewed
by the substance of ethical precepts. Further, the thrust of the
Moulton article is that lawyers who engage in multi-jurisdiction
practices face uncertainty about how rules will be interpreted
and enforced differently in multiple jurisdictions, not whether
enforcement machinery has substantial disparities.126 Moulton
even limits those potential multi-jurisdictional ethics conflicts
and states that “where compliance with one state’s rule would
mean violation of another state’s rule, and vice versa—is largely
limited to the area of attorney-client confidentiality and exists
only as a result of the rules in four states.”127 The Moulton
article does not provide Anderson and Muller a safe harbor
against the need to test their predictions of dramatically
increased attorney disciplinary cases in other states with lower
MBE cut scores.
The reality is that the cross-state disciplinary articles that
Anderson and Muller cite provide comparative attorney
122

See Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 17).
See Curtis, supra note 121, at 209.
124
See generally id.
125
Moulton, supra note 121, at 95–96.
126
Id. at 76–77.
127
Id. at 100. “In terms of the states that have adopted the Model Rules,
therefore, the level of disparity in adopted standards is not as great as advertised.”
Id. at 91.
123
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disciplinary statistics that are very germane to their prediction of
escalating disciplinary cases if California were to change its MBE
cut score to 133 or some other number lower than 144. The
following chart demonstrates that the percentage of attorneys
with disciplinary charges and the mean ratio of disciplinary
charges to actual disciplined attorneys in states with 133 MBE
cut scores are not only similar to one another, but they are also
not dramatically different than current California statistics.128
Anderson and Muller’s prediction of a 10% increase in attorney
disciplinary cases in California if the MBE cut score is changed
to 133 is simply not supported by the comparative state attorney
disciplinary evidence.129
The following chart compares the percentage of attorneys
charged with disciplinary violations and the rate of convictions to
charges lodged in each state that uses a 133 MBE cut score with
those rates in California that has a 144 cut score:

128

I agree that comparing different jurisdictions’ disciplinary rates may not
always be statistically accurate if those states have extremely different rates of
enforcement and/or conviction rates. However, the states in this comparison of 133
cut scores, other than Iowa, each have almost identical rates of prosecution and
similar conviction rates.
129
It is obvious that lowering the MBE cut score from 144 to 133 would result in
more attorneys being admitted to the bar and that more disciplinary cases would be
expected as the number of practicing attorneys increases. However, as discussed,
infra Part II.B, it is a very different question of whether that increase in disciplinary
cases is a function of bar examination performance or whether it is merely a result of
bias and structural functions of the state bar disciplinary system itself.
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STATE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY STATISTICS FOR CALIFORNIA
(MBE 144) & FOR STATES WITH 133 MBE CUT SCORES130

State
California131
Connecticut132
Illinois133
Iowa134
Kansas135
Montana136
New Jersey137
New York138
South Carolina139

% of Attorneys
Charged to Number
of Active Attorneys
Approx. 1%
Approx. 1%
<1%
Approx. 1%
Approx. 1%
Approx. 1%
<1%
<1%
1–3%

Mean % of Attorneys
Charged to Those
Actually Disciplined
10%
15%
5%
25%
13%
17%
8%
8%
12%

This data demonstrates that the percentage of active
attorneys with formal disciplinary complaints is similar across
jurisdictions, even where MBE cut scores range from as low as
133 to as high as 144, as in California. In addition, unlike
Anderson’s and Muller’s prediction that changing the cut score
from 144 to 133 will result in at least a 10%, or possibly greater,
increase in the California attorney disciplinary rate, the chart
demonstrates that Iowa is the only state that has ever recorded a
rate over 19%. Further, in three states with a 133 MBE cut
score, the percentage of disciplined attorneys is lower than in
California—Illinois, New Jersey, and New York. In three other
states, the percentage is only slightly higher than in California—
Connecticut, Kansas, and South Carolina. Not only does the data

130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

This data is derived from Curtis, supra note 121, at 209.
Id. at 227–28.
Id. at 232–33.
Id. at 241, 245.
Id. at 248–50.
Id. at 250–52.
Id. at 267, 270–71.
Id. at 279, 282–83.
Id. at 285, 288–89.
Id. at 301–03.
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not support their assertion, but the California Bar Association’s
own study found no correlation between bar exam cut scores and
attorney discipline.140
B.

Anderson and Muller Have Failed To Prove a Causal Link or
Even a Critical Connection Between Bar Examination Scores
and the Rate of Attorney Discipline
Anderson and Muller state that they are “confident that the
relationship between lower bar examination score and higher
discipline is accurate.”141 They do not clarify whether that
statement asserts that the relationship is merely a correlation or
whether they assert a statistically significant causal link
between low bar scores and attorney discipline. After their paper
was published and received significant criticism for their
methodology and conclusions, they attempted to walk back what
many readers thought was the authors’ claim of a causal link
between bar scores and attorney discipline.142 For example,
Professor Merritt concluded: “Despite some suggestive language
in the paper, Anderson and Muller do not identify a direct
correlation between bar exam scores and disciplinary actions.”143
She stated that no causation was proven because there is a
ten-year gap between the bar exam and attorney discipline
manifesting and because they presented no proof of a connection
between what the bar exam tests and the types of issues for
which California attorneys are predominately disciplined.144
The same day that Merritt’s critical review of their article
was published, Anderson began backtracking.
Anderson
attempted to make it clear that their paper does not allege
causation between bar exam scores and attorney state bar
discipline.
In his response, he provided two antithetical
explanations for their paper’s findings: (1) “low bar exam scores
are not actually causing discipline, but rather [are] merely
140

Report to the Supreme Court of the State of California Final Report on the
2017 California Bar Exam Standard Setting Study, STATE BAR OF CALI. 44–45
(2017), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/communications/CA-state-BarBar-Exam09122017.pdf.
141
Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 14).
142
For an excellent analysis and criticism of the Anderson and Muller article,
see Deborah J. Merritt, Bar Exam Score and Lawyer Discipline, L. SCH. CAFE (June
3, 2017), https://www.lawschoolcafe.org/2017/06/03/bar-exam-scores-and-lawyerdiscipline/.
143
Id.
144
Id.
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correlated with it;” and (2) their paper “argues that the current
proposal to lower the required passing score for the California
Bar Exam would result in an increased rate of discipline.”145 The
problem, of course, is that when one argues that X action on Y
will result in Z effect, you are stating causation: “Causation
indicates that one event is the result of the occurrence of the
other event; i.e. there is a causal relationship between the two
events. This is also referred to as cause and effect.”146
At most, all that Anderson and Muller have demonstrated is
that there is a greater chance that California attorneys who
scored lower on the bar examination have a higher chance of
being disciplined than those who scored higher. That does not
prove that attorneys with lower bar scores commit more ethical
violations, but rather, only that California’s attorney disciplinary
system happened to identify and sanction a greater percentage of
lower scoring bar exam attorneys. Anderson and Muller have not
proven causation because the disparity in disciplinary filings
may be caused by so many other variables that they did not build
into a multi-variate analysis to determine relative causal weight,
or as Professor Anderson recently phrased the issue, “the exact
magnitude” of the relationship.147
Their discussion of the differences between graduates of
“elite” law schools and graduates of lower ranked schools in
terms of the types of jobs they accept and the levels of predictive
ethical violations within each of those types of legal employment
is problematic. The gist of their argument is as follows:
1. Elite law school students score much higher on the bar
exam;148
2. Elite law school students hire into elite legal jobs;149 and
3. California disciplinary records indicate a much lower
percentage of disciplinary cases against those from elite
law schools who work in elite law jobs.150
145

Robert Anderson, Responsibility and Irresponsibility in the California Bar
Exam Debate, WITNESSETH: LAW, DEALS, & DATA (June 2, 2017), https://witnesseth.
typepad.com/blog/2017/06/responsibility-and-irresponsibility-in-the-california-barexam-debate.html (emphasis added).
146
Statistical Language – Correlation and Causation, AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF
STATISTICS (last updated July 3, 2013), http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/
a3121120.nsf/home/statistical+language+-+correlation+and+causation.
147
Anderson, supra note 145.
148
See id.
149
Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 16–17).
150
See id.
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And their argument continues:
4. Students from non-elite or much lower ranked law schools
score lower on the bar exam;151
5. Students from lower ranked law schools and who perform
lower on the bar exam get jobs that are different, like
jobs in solo practice or small firms;152 and
6. California disciplinary records indicate a much higher
percentage of disciplinary cases involving attorneys from
lower ranked schools who work in solo practice or small
firms.153
Anderson and Muller have justified their study as necessary to
protect “the most vulnerable, least sophisticated clients;”154
however, they fail to discuss one of the most vulnerable client
populations: criminal defendants, who are often at the mercy of
prosecutors who graduated from elite law schools. Anderson and
Muller do not discuss the ethical crisis among the highest scoring
bar examination test takers from the most elite law schools who
work in the United States Attorney Office or in elite state and
county prosecution units. According to one U.S. Attorney’s
Office, not only is hiring into that office “highly competitive,” but
those with “a judicial clerk[ship]” will be considered even if they
do not have the expected years of lawyering experience.155
Harvard Law School even informs its students that those who
have a judicial clerkship have a serious leg up on the competition
for becoming a U.S. Attorney.156 In addition, attorney jobs in
county and city district attorney offices in large cities have
become exceedingly competitive, with graduates from elite law
schools now representing a large percentage of lawyers hired and
graduates from fourth-tier law schools being rarely hired.157
151

Anderson, supra note 145.
Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 16–17).
153
Id. at 16–18.
154
Anderson, supra note 145.
155
Attorneys/Lawyers Employment, U.S. ATTY’S OFF. CENT. DISTRICT OF CALI.,
https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/employment/attorneyslawyers (last visited June 1,
2019).
156
Joan Ruttenberg et al., The Fast Track to a U.S. Attorney’s Office, BERNARD
KOTEEN OFFICE OF PUB. INTEREST ADVISING, HARVARD LAW SCH., 8 (2014),
https://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2008/06/fast-track-final.pdf.
157
It is extremely difficult to engage in a comprehensive study of district
attorneys’ law schools because district attorney offices rarely publish a list of their
attorneys. However, the Santa Clara, California District Attorney Office recently
announced the hiring of fifteen new lawyers, which may be used as an example. See
152
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Professor Muller has recently catalogued the relationship
among elite law school students and judicial clerkships; they are
essentially one and the same. His study indicates that, from
2014 to 2016, a super-majority of federal clerks attended only a
handful of elite law schools including: Yale University, 200;
Stanford University, 153; Harvard University, 312; University of
Chicago, 98; University of Virginia, 159; Duke University, 82;
University of California-Irvine, 40; University of CaliforniaBerkeley, 110; and the University of Michigan, 119.158 In
contrast, students from fourth-tier California Law Schools simply
did not receive federal clerkships: Golden Gate University, zero;
Whittier Law School, zero; Western State College of Law, zero;
and Southwestern Law School, one.159
Therefore, a review of ethical violations within the U.S.
Attorney’s Office and other large city elite District Attorney
Offices puts the Anderson and Muller findings to its strictest
test. Under their theory, we should find an ethically pristine
legal environment in offices staffed by high bar exam scoring
elite law students. The data, however, tells a very different

District Attorney Hires 15 New Lawyers, OFF. OF DIST. ATT’Y CTY. OF SANTA CLARA,
https://www.sccgov.org/sites/da/newsroom/
newsreleases/Pages/NRA2012/District-Attorney-Hires-15-New-Lawyers.aspx
(last
visited June 1, 2019). I took that list of attorneys’ names and searched for the law
school from which each graduated in a public attorney search offered by the
California State Bar. See Licensee Search, STATE BAR OF CAL.,
http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/LicenseeSearch/QuickSearch (last visited June 1,
2019) (enter the desired attorney’s name or licensee number in the search bar; then
click search). One of the fifteen attorneys hired is deceased and those records are no
longer maintained. Of the other fourteen attorneys hired, none attended any of the
bottom quartile schools referenced by Anderson and Muller as likely to produce
attorneys whose bar exam scores predict higher likelihood of bar discipline. And of
those fourteen who were hired, one attended Harvard, one attended Stanford, two
attended Berkeley, one attended UCLA, and one attended University of Virginia. It
is generally recognized in the legal hiring arena that graduates of elite law schools
have a distinct advantage in district attorney hiring decisions: “You must also excel
while you are attending law school and it always looks better if you attend one of the
more prestigious schools in the country.” Silas Reed, How to Become a District
Attorney, LAW CROSSING, http://www.lawcrossing.com/article/5426/How-to-Becomea-District-Attorney/ (last visited June 1, 2019).
158
Derek T. Muller, Visualizing Law School Federal Clerkship Placements,
2014-2016, EXCESS DEMOCRACY (May 15, 2017), http://excessofdemocracy.com/
blog/2017/5/visualizing-law-school-federal-judicial-clerkship-placement-2014-2016.
159
Id.
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story: some of these prosecutors commit serious ethical violations
that place citizens in jeopardy of losing their liberty.160
The Northern California Innocence Project published a study
of hundreds of cases of demonstrated prosecutorial misconduct in
California, including those that occurred in California federal
courts where prosecutors were almost never sanctioned.161 The
Innocence Project data demonstrates that Anderson and Muller
are asking not only an incorrect question, but also an unfair one.
The issue is not how many attorneys are actually disciplined, but
how many and which attorneys are committing ethical violations
even if the disciplinary system does not prosecute them. The
Innocence study found that judges rarely refer prosecutorial
malpractice cases to the California Bar Association, and even if
those cases are referred, the Bar Association rarely proceeds with
disciplinary action: “Courts fail to report prosecutorial
misconduct (despite having a statutory obligation to do so),
prosecutors deny that it occurred, and the California State Bar
almost never disciplines it.”162 Even though the State Bar
Disciplinary overall conviction rate is 10%, only 1% of the
prosecutorial misconduct claims the State Bar investigates result
in convictions.163 “[T]he State Bar publicly disciplined only one
percent of the prosecutors in the 600 cases in which the courts
found prosecutorial misconduct and NCIP researchers identified
the prosecutor.”164 Unlike the solo practitioners who Anderson
and Muller accuse of committing the lion’s share of California’s

160

See, e.g., Maura Dolan, U. S. Judges See ‘Epidemic’ of Prosecutorial
Misconduct in State, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/
local/politics/la-me-lying-prosecutors-20150201-story.html
(chronicling
recent
examples of serious prosecutorial misconduct in California courts that have been
characterized as “epidemic”).
161
KATHLEEN RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT,
SANTA CLARA UNIV. SCH. OF L., PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997-2009 2–4 (2010), http://digitalcommons.
law.scu.edu/ncippubs/2.
162
Id. at 3.
In California, as in many states, prosecutors rarely face sanctions for their
courtroom tactics. For that reason, the Field case—which could result in
the prosecutor being suspended or even barred from the practice of law—is
seen by some as a test of the system’s ability to police itself.
Leslie Griffy, Prosecutor Faces Rare Disciplinary Hearing Today, MERCURY NEWS
(May 20, 2008, updated Aug. 14, 2016), http://www.mercurynews.com/
2008/05/20/prosecutor-faces-rare-disciplinary-hearing-today/.
163
See Table, supra Part II.A.
164
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 161, at 3.
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ethical violations, U.S. Attorneys and District Attorneys can use
the political power of their offices to shield themselves from
obloquy.165
Perhaps the most famous denouncement of prosecutorial
misconduct was by Judge Alex Kozinski, who said that violations
“have reached epidemic proportions in recent years,” and that
“[p]rofessional discipline is rare.”166 However, because, as Judge
Kozinski states, “it’s highly unlikely [prosecutorial] wrongdoing
will ever come to light,” we may never have the ability to
compare the extent of ethical violations among attorneys from
elite law schools in elite prosecution offices with graduates of
lower ranked law schools in solo and small firm practice.167
These attorneys who attended elite law schools, scored very
well on the bar examination, and were hired into elite
prosecution offices demonstrate the methodological flaws within
Anderson’s and Muller’s conclusions.
Their study did not
sufficiently account for system effects, such as political factors
that affect the filing of state bar disciplinary actions or elite law
firm “in-house” mechanisms for keeping ethical violations secret.
In addition, elite law firm clients may prefer to address their
problems privately rather than report misconduct to the state
bar. As the data on the lack of state bar sanctions against
prosecutorial misconduct demonstrates, state bar disciplinary
statistics do not predict the number of relative ethical violations
among different groups of attorneys, but rather only predict the
chances that those who violate ethics rules will be reported and
prosecuted.
All that Anderson and Muller have demonstrated is what the
State Bar has known for more than a decade: (1) graduates of
less elite law schools are more likely to work in solo or small
firms where their ethical violations are more likely to be
discovered, to be referred to the State Bar, and to require
165

See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Avila, 678 F.3d 955, 956 (9th Cir. 2012)
(denying the U.S. Attorney’s Office motion to have the federal court delete the U.S.
Attorney’s name from a case where prosecutorial misconduct played a significant
role).
166
United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 630–31 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting). Although Olsen dealt with the failure of a U.S. Attorney to proffer
alleged exculpatory information, Judge Kozinski also discussed other forms of
prosecutorial misconduct, such as using unreliable experts and stated “some
prosecutors turn a blind eye to such misconduct because they’re more interested in
gaining a conviction than achieving a just result.” Id. at 632.
167
Id. at 630.
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discipline; and (2) graduates of elite law schools are more likely
to work either in elite law firms or elite government positions
where their ethical violations are less likely to be either
discovered or reported, and those violations are less likely to
result in disciplinary sanctions.168
For instance, in 2001, the California State Bar issued a
report studying complaints about disparate treatment of big law
firm attorneys and solo practice and small firm attorneys in the
disciplinary system.169 The study found that the State Bar
Disciplinary system “is predominantly complaint driven,” and
that practitioners of personal injury law, family law, criminal
law, workers’ compensation, and building contract disputes are
most often referred to the State Bar’s disciplinary system.170 But,
perhaps most importantly, the State Bar study found that the
culture in elite or large firms makes it much less likely that elite
law firm lawyers who commit ethical violations will be referred to
the State Bar disciplinary system:
[S]olo and small firm attorneys can find themselves so
overworked that they miss a statute of limitations, neglect to
communicate a settlement offer or fail to return a client’s phone
call. In a large law firm, while these mistakes could result in a
reprimand from the firm or even the loss of a job, it would not
usually result in a complaint to the Bar.171

Thus, a review of the differences between disciplinary actions
against solo and small firm lawyers and elite law firm lawyers
does not support Anderson and Muller’s conclusion that solo and
small firm lawyers pose a greater risk to consumers because we
lack data on the comparative number and seriousness of ethical
violations by elite firm lawyers that are kept in-house and never
reported. Perhaps Anderson and Muller’s cynical observation
168

See generally Anderson & Muller, supra note 4.
STATE BAR OF CAL., INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF DISCIPLINARY
COMPLAINTS AGAINST ATTORNEYS IN SOLO PRACTICE, SMALL SIZE LAW FIRMS AND
LARGE SIZE LAW FIRMS 14 (2001), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/
reports/2001_SB143-Report.pdf? ver=2017-05-19-134106-347. The State Bar did not
find a bias against solo practice and small firm practitioners, but rather that more
complaints were filed against those attorneys than against large firm attorneys. Id.
170
Id. at 14, 17. The State Bar report included several other variables that
justified the greater percentage of solo practice and small firm attorney cases
litigated in the State Bar disciplinary system that have nothing to do with the actual
ethical violation being investigated: (1) solo practice and small firm attorneys often
cannot afford to hire an attorney to defend them in the State Bar Proceeding; (2) solo
practice and small firm attorneys’ records are often less cooperative. Id. at 1–2, 13.
171
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
169

2019] BAR PASSAGE RATES AND ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

81

about students from elite law schools is correct: “It may be the
case that graduates of more elite law schools are more
sophisticated in covering up their unethical behavior. . . .”172
Anderson and Muller have not proven that attorneys that
graduate from lower ranked schools, score lower on the bar, and
work in solo practice and small firms are (1) more unethical; (2) a
greater danger to consumers; or (3) incompetent to practice law.
In addition, as discussed in Part 1, the Connecticut attorney
disciplinary study determined that there is no correlation
between law school grades and disciplinary patterns, and that
the correlation between attending a low ranked law school and
disciplinary cases is only 0.3%.173
C.

The Methodological Flaws and Weakness of the Study

Anderson and Muller admit that a well-designed and highly
predictive study of the relationship between bar passage and
attorney discipline would consist of the following data on each
disciplined attorney, including:
1. Law school attended;
2. Date of Admission;
3. LSAT score;
4. Law school GPA;
5. Public disciplinary record;
6. Bar exam score, including MBE score.174
However, the authors did not use individualized LSAT scores,
law school GPAs, or bar exam scores. Instead, they use what
they term “proxies” for this data. The chain of proxies, difficult
to follow, is linked in the following manner:
1. A disciplined attorney’s LSAT score was estimated based
on the 25th and 75th percentile LSAT scores at the
However, this calculation
attorney’s law school.175
amounts to no more than a guess of where that student
fits on the full range of LSAT scores within the law school.
The probability of the accuracy of that prediction is very
low and such an erroneous estimate could significantly
affect any conclusions regarding that particular
disciplined attorney’s bar passage score.
172
173
174
175

Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 17).
Levin et al., supra note 7, at 32.
Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3–7).
Id. (manuscript at 6–7).
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2. They then predicted the law school’s average bar passage
score by using the LSAT average by “interpolating” that
score from data published by the National Conference of
Bar Examiners [“NCBE”].176
One problem is that
Anderson and Muller do not describe their interpolation
protocol. The NCBE does not publish individual law
school students’ or law schools’ LSAT scores or MBE
scores, and therefore, it is difficult to understand how this
interpolation has any statistical validity regarding the
analysis of any single disciplined attorney referred to the
State Bar.
3. They then tested their model against a single set of data
for the July 2016 California that examined the mean MBE
scores of individual law schools—but not the scores of
individual test takers.177 The obvious problem is that the
Anderson and Muller study analyzed bar exam data for
graduates from 1975 to 2006, but their test instrument
was based on a single administration of the California bar
examination. They did not address the possibility that
the school specific bar passage scores and mean MBE
scores were aberrant for that July 2016 administration of
the California bar examination.
Based upon my
inspection of California State Bar Examination records for
tests from February 2007 to July 2015 for Whittier Law
School, the first-time test taker MBE mean scores varied
from a low of 133.6 to a high of 146.4.178 This significant
variation
among
different
bar
examination
administrations demonstrates the methodological flaw in
the Anderson and Muller study. A single law school’s
mean MBE score cannot accurately predict an individual
attorney’s disciplinary history.

176

Id. (manuscript at 7).
Id. I commiserate with their inability to gather sufficient data from the State
Bar to conduct a more statistically reliable study, and I join their request that more
State Bar data should be released to the public.
178
Patton, supra note 92, at 33.
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D. A Study of Wisconsin Attorney Disciplinary Cases
Demonstrates That No Correlation Exists Between Passing a
Bar Exam or Admission by Diploma Privilege, and
Disciplinary Violation Rates
A study, submitted to the ABA Council by the author,
demonstrates that there is no correlation between attorney
discipline and bar admission method, whether through passing a
bar exam or through being admitted pursuant to “diploma
privilege.”179 In that study, the author examined Wisconsin
disciplined attorneys from January 2013 to March 2016 in
relation to whether they had to pass a bar exam or whether they
were admitted by diploma privilege.180 By employing a chisquare analysis, the data demonstrated that there was no valid
statistical relationship between rates and/or the seriousness of
attorney disciplinary violations and attorneys’ method of bar
admission.181 The results actually disproved my hypothesis that
diploma privilege admitted attorneys would have a greater
number and more serious ethical violations than those who
passed a bar exam. In a companion study of bar passers versus
diploma admitted attorneys, the author conducted an additional
analysis of the patterns and seriousness of those two groups’
disciplinary violations.182 The results demonstrated that the bar
passage group had more sustained disciplinary cases and that
those disciplinary violations were usually based upon more
serious ethical violations than the diploma admitted attorneys.183
For instance, the diploma admitted group’s recidivist rate was
0.99, but the bar exam group’s rate was 1.52.184 The diploma

179

Memorandum from William Wesley Patton, Professor Emeritus, Whittier
Law School, Assistant Clinical Vol Professor, UCLA David Geffen School of
Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, to ABA Council (Apr. 22, 2016).
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_
admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/comments/201607_comment
_s316_william_patton_2.pdf. The author submitted additional bar exam studies to
the ABA, which can be found at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_
education/resources/notice_and_comment/notice_comment_archive/.
180
Id. at 4–5.
181
Id. at 6–7.
182
Memorandum from William Wesley Patton to ABA Council on Legal
Education & Admission to the Bar 1 (May 7, 2016).
183
Id.
184
Id. at 3. The “recidivist rate” refers to those attorneys who committed one or
more additional disciplinary violation after having been formally disciplined for a
previous ethical violation.
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group’s violations involving dishonesty was 33%, but it was 43%
for the bar exam group.185 The percentage of cases involving
monetary violations was similar for both groups: 40% for diploma
admitted and 46% for bar exam admitted.186
These two studies of the differences between Wisconsin
attorneys admitted by bar exam versus those admitted by the
diploma privilege raise serious questions about the Anderson and
Muller conclusions.
The Wisconsin studies suggest the
possibility that the bar exam could be either irrelevant or only
marginally relevant in predicting attorney misconduct. Much
more research is needed before we determine whether there is
any correlation between bar examination performance and
predicted disciplinary violations.
E.

Anderson and Muller’s Claim That Lowering the California
MBE Cut Score Will Increase Malpractice Cases Is
Inconsistent with State Bar Disciplinary Statistics

Anderson and Muller predicted that those with low
California bar passage scores would have a greater chance of
being disciplined than attorneys with high passage scores.187
They assumed, without analysis, that those disciplined attorneys
would “increase the amount of malpractice, misconduct, and
discipline among [California attorneys]” and that would reduce
consumer protection.188
First, Anderson and Muller presented no data to
demonstrate that changing the California MBE cut score would
increase malpractice rates.
They did not present any
quantitative or qualitative data and analysis to prove that the
types of misconduct that result in attorney discipline in
California also would support the very different legal standard in
malpractice cases. Many acts sanctioned by the State Bar do not
amount to malpractice. A study that the author sent to the ABA
Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar analyzed
163 California State Bar disciplinary opinions issued from
January 1 to April 30, 2016.189 That analysis demonstrated that

185
186
187
188
189

Id.
Id.
Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2–3).
Id. (manuscript at 2) (emphasis added).
Memorandum from Patton, supra note 182, at 1.
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51% of the 163 charges involved client trust fund violations.190
Many of those violations only involved inappropriate comingling
of funds.191 Almost none of those cases would support legal
malpractice filings because most of the violations either did not
result in harm to the client versus potential harm to the client, or
they did not result in any prejudice to the client’s legal cause of
action. Another 18% of the cases involved drug and/or alcohol
problems or failures to meet disciplinary probation conditions,
issues unrelated to any specific lawyer acts that would give rise
to a malpractice action.192 Cases associated with the common
claims for malpractice such as not meeting a statute of
limitations, failure to call a critical witness, failure to reasonably
engage in discovery, failure to inform a client of a proffered
settlement offer, etc., were almost non-existent. Therefore,
Anderson and Muller’s prediction that lowering the California
MBE score would result in a substantial increase in malpractice
claims is simply unproven and empirically unsupported.
Anderson and Muller admitted that lowering the MBE cut
score may “increase access to justice and likely lower costs for
consumers.”193 However, they did not decide whether such
benefits are outweighed by their prediction of increased bar
discipline. They provided no evidence that indigent clients would
be better off proceeding pro se rather than being represented by
an attorney who graduated from an accredited law school and
who passed a bar exam but who is predicted to commit an
unspecified ethical violation sometime during that attorney’s
career.194
They have presented insufficient evidence that
California attorneys who score lower than 144 on the bar exam
and who would be admitted to practice law in almost every other
state pose a serious risk to the California public.
CONCLUSION
I applaud Professors Kinsler, Anderson, and Muller for
investigating whether the bar examination is relevant to
patterns of attorney discipline. However, their research failed to
190

Id. at 6.
See id.
192
Id.
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Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 19).
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In one study, “[Sixty-two percent] of the judges said that outcomes were
worse for the unrepresented parties.” Judge Denise S. Owens, The Reality of Pro Se
Representation, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 147, 148–49 (2013).
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prove that: (1) students from low rated law schools engage in
significantly more unethical behavior; (2) there is a causal
relationship or correlation between students who attend low
ranked schools, their bar exam scores, and their disciplinary
patterns; or (3) students from low ranked schools who scored
lower on the bar exam are either not minimally competent to
practice law or are a significantly greater danger to the public
than students who attended elite law schools. They also failed to
prove that lowering an extremely high MBE cut score to one near
the national MBE mean will have any significant effect on
attorney misconduct. Finally, they failed to demonstrate any
connection between the number of times attorneys retake the bar
exam, attorney disciplinary rates, and danger to the public.
Serious social harm can result from reliance on statistically
and methodologically flawed bar examination studies. For
instance, from my perspective, Anderson and Muller’s zealous
arguments against lowering the California MBE cut scores could
needlessly lead to: (1) a loss of many attorney candidates,
including diversity candidates, who could provide legal services
to California residents; (2) an unreasonable monopoly on the
practice of law that has long-term impact on the availability and
cost of legal services; and (3) great economic and psychological
harm to the hundreds of attorney applicants whose MBE scores
demonstrate that they would have been admitted to most other
state bar associations in the United States,195 but who, because
of the 144 MBE cut score, failed the California bar examination.
In addition, Kinsler’s proposed national maximum number of bar
examination attempts will substantially limit access to the bar by
qualified candidates whose circumstances, such as single
parenthood, poverty, or health, create significant challenges to
studying for the bar. Ultimately, the studies by Professor

195

Id. at 148–49. Anderson’s earlier study demonstrated that California’s
fourth-tier law schools’ mean MBE scores on the California Bar Examination would
have resulted in those students passing the New York bar examination at rates
between fifty-seven percent and eighty-three percent. Anderson, supra note 145. In
addition, Professor Muller has demonstrated that even though many California bar
exam test takers fail the California bar exam, students from California law schools
perform better on the MBE than students in other states. Derek T. Muller,
California Bar Exam Takers Are Far More Able than Others Nationwide but Fail at
DEMOCRACY
(Nov.
21,
2015),
Much
Higher
Rates,
EXCESS
http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2015/11/california-bar-exam-takers-are-far-moreable-than-others-nationwide-but-fail-at-much-higher-rates.
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Kinsler, and Professors Anderson and Muller, while
commendable in their aims, represent little more than
methodologically flawed attempts to rationalize harmful and
elitist intuitions about the legal profession.

